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A FINE LINE, REDEFINED: MOVING TOWARD MORE
EQUITABLE ASYLUM POLICIES
Heather M. Kolinskyt

I. INTRODUCTION
The small fishing boat sat empty at the end of a pier near a small
row of townhouses on Layton Key, Florida. In it, an empty bottle of
rum, a tarp, and a few limes. There were high winds that morning, a
precursor to Hurricane Andrew,l which would arrive two days later.
The boat traveled approximately 105 miles through the Florida Straits
to arrive at its destination. Six Cuban men arrived that morning, and
when they stepped ashore, they were presumably entitled to stay. 2
Just one year earlier, the Soviet Union had collapsed. 3 The subsidies
and benefits Cuba received from its Soviet partner had diminished, if
not completely disappeared. 4
These Cuban men, like many Cubans who would arrive on U.S.
shores during the early 1990s, were more likely seeking to escape
t

1.

2.
3.

4.

Heather M. Kolinsky, B.A. Stetson University, J.D. Rutgers University - Camden, is
an associate professor of law at Barry University Law School in Orlando, Florida.
The topic of this article was presented at the 2008 Southeastern Association of Law
Schools annual meeting as a part of the New Scholars Workshop. I must thank Colby
Ferris and Lindsay Harrison Hall for their research support; and Tai Heng Chen, Pat
Tolan, and Leonard Birdsong for their helpful comments. Finally, my heartfelt thanks
to Richard Robbins whose research and citation support for this article were
invaluable, you are the best.
Hurricane Andrew hit south Florida on August 24, 1992, as a category five hurricane.
Ed Rappaport, Preliminary Report Hurricane Andrew 16-28 August, 1992, NAT'L
HURRICANE CTR. (Dec. 10, 1998), http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/1992andrew.html.
See 8 U.S.c. § 1255 (2006).
ROBERT STRAYER, WHY DID THE SOVIET UNION COLLAPSE? UNDERSTANDING
HISTORICAL CHANGE 3 (1998) (noting official dissolution of Soviet Union at the end
of the day, December 25, 1991, after President Mikhael S. Gorbachev's resignation
speech); Mikhael S. Gorbachev, President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
Resignation Speech (Dec. 25, 1991), available at http://www.pubJicpurpose.comllibgorb911225.htm.
See LOUIS A. PEREZ, JR., CUBA: BETWEEN REFORM & REVOLUTION 381-87 (2d ed.
1995), available at http://www.historyofCuba.comlhistory/havanailperez2.htm
(discussing the impact that the collapse of the Soviet Union had on resources in Cuba
and Cuba's relationship with its Eastern bloc trading partners, as well as government
imposed rationing of goods).
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food scarcity, avoid economic deprivation, and discover opportunity
than they were seeking to escape an oppressive political regime. 5
Nearly twenty years later, Cubans continue to enjoy preferential
immigration treatment, although it has been limited since 1994 to
Cuban refugees who actually reach our shores. 6
Imagine another small fishing boat lands the next day, having
braved high winds and rough seas, but this one is filled with six
Haitian men. They seek to escape political oppression and economic
deprivation. 7 During the preceding year, Haitians had experienced a
military coup that ousted their first democratically elected president;
as a result, thousands of Haitians were paroled into the United States
after prescreening in Guantanamo Bay.8 However, this process
grounded to a halt in May 1992 because of the sheer numbers of
Haitians seeking to escape political violence. 9
When these Haitians stepped ashore, there was no presumption that
they were entitled to asylum, nor special consideration whatsoever. 10
5.
6.

7.
8.

9.

10.

See id.
Wet-Foot Dry-Foot Policy, U.S. IMMIGRATION SUPPORT, http://www.usimmigration
support.orglwetfoot-dryfoot.html (last visited May 16,2011). While Cuban refugees
intercepted at sea are still entitled to make an asylum claim, they are more likely to be
returned to Cuba than permitted to enter the United States. Id.
See Lori A. Nessel, Externalized Borders and the Invisible Refugee, 40 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REv. 625, 625-26 (2008).
Jean Bertrand Aristide, who became the first democratically elected president of Haiti
in 1991, was overthrown in a military coup by the Tonton Macoutes just seven
months after he was elected. Id. at 693. In 1991, after the coup in Haiti,
approximately 10,490 Haitians were paroled into the United States after a
prescreening interview at Guantanamo determined that they had a credible fear of
persecution if returned to Haiti. RUTH ELLEN WASEM, CONGo RESEARCH SERV., U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY ON HAITIAN MIGRANTS 3 (Jan. 21, 2005), available at
http://trac.syr.edulimmigration/libraryIP960.pd£ But this parole did not mean they
would receive asylum, and in fact, many did not. Id. at 3-4.
WASEM, supra note 8, at 3. On May 24,1992, because of the surge of Haitians, the
U.S. Coast Guard was once again ordered to intercept all Haitians in boats and
immediately return them to Haiti without interviews to determine whether they were
at risk of persecution. Id. In 1994, the Clinton administration again attempted to
prescreen Haitian refugees for asylum but stopped after a few weeks, citing the
exodus of Haitians as the reason to suspend the screening, much like the Bush
administration had. Id. at 3-4.
See id. at 2-3. Beginning in 1981, the U.S. Coast Guard had been directed to stop and
search vessels suspected of transporting undocumented Haitians. Id. From 1981
through 1990, 22,940 Haitians were questioned at sea. Id. Of this number, eleven
Haitians qualified to apply for asylum in the United States and the rest were denied
access. See id. Other than the brief respites from interdiction in 1991 and 1994,
Haitians have historically received little consideration in the asylum process.
Currently, Haitians are still subject to interdiction and many more are denied asylum.
See Javier Arteaga, The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966: More Than Forty Years Later
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In fact, they were more likely to be deported rather than receive
asylum in this country, let alone the opportunity to seek permanent
residency. II To this day, Haitians' "differences" remain a barrier to
receiving the type of asylum protection enjoyed by their Caribbean
neighbors. 12
If discrimination based on nationality or politics is not absurd
enough when dealing with those seeking refuge in this country, what
about gender-based discrimination imposed on refugees fleeing the
same country? Consider a young Chinese man who enters the
country illegally after being smuggled in a container ship to the port
in Los Angeles. Although he entered the United States to escape a
country that forcibly aborted his unborn child and that allowed
officials to detain him when he refused to tell them where the woman
carrying his unborn child was hiding, he will not be entitled to
asylum here because he is male and his '"resistance''' is not deemed
sufficient to warrant asylum. 13 The irony is that, had the woman who

11.

12.

13.

a Proposal/or the Future, 3 FLA. INT'T U. L. REV. 509,510-11 (2008) (noting that a
boat of fleeing Haitian nationals picked up two near-death Cubans at sea, and when
the vessel arrived in Miami, the Haitians were deported and the Cubans were paroled
into the United States). However, following the recent earthquake in Haiti, the
Obama administration announced that it would grant tens of thousands of Haitian
See Sergio Bustos, Obama
nationals Temporary Protected Status (TPS).
Administration Grants TPS to Haitians, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 15, 2010, available at
http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/haiti/haitians-tps.htm. Only those Haitians in the
United States as of January 12, 2010, are eligible for TPS. Id. Those who traveled
here after January 12, 2010, are not eligible for TPS and will be repatriated. Id.
The statistics from the U.S. Department of Justice show that on average, less than
one-in-four Haitians receive asylum in the United States. See EXEC. OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION COURTS ASYLUM
STATISTICS, available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/efoialfoiafreq.htm (follow
hyperlinks for various years under the heading "Asylum Statistics by Nationality").
In 2007, 4486 Haitians applied for asylum, but asylum was only granted to 586. Id.
In 2008, 3303 applied, and only 510 were approved. Id. In 2009, 1809 applied and
only 406 were approved. Id.
See Nessel, supra note 7, at 693-94. Nessel notes that "[t]he 'othering' of Haitians
dates back to the European slave trade with Africa." Id. (citing ROBERT LAWLESS,
HAITI'S BAD PRESS 30-48 (1992)). Those roots of racism "contributed to the
characterization of Haitians as "barbarians[,] cannibals," and "voodoo worshippers,"
who were described as "'dumb, drumming, demoralized, and up to no good.'" Id. at
694 (quoting ROBERT LAWLESS, HAITI'S BAD PRESS 33-34 (1992)).
See Ming Shi Chen v. Bd. Of Immigration Appeals, 247 F. App'x 304, 305 (2d Cir.
2007) (quoting Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 494 F.3d 296,313-14 (2d Cir.
2007) (noting that "the fact that an individual's spouse or partner has been forced to
have an abortion 'does not, on its own, constitute resistance to coercive family
planning'''); Zhi Zhi Chen v. Gonzales, 152 F. App'x 528, 529-31 (7th Cir. 2005)
(holding that the immigration judge was not unreasonable in characterizing Chen's
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was carrying his unborn child traveled to the United States in the
container ship, she would be entitled to asylum based solely on the
fact that she underwent the procedure that aborted their child. 14
The regulation of the entry and exclusion of aliens 15 in our country
is a "fundamental act[] of sovereignty" that is "vested exclusively in
the legislative and executive branches.,,16 "The single most salient
feature of the government's immigration power is the fact that it is
substantially unconstrained as a constitutional matter.,,17 Congress's
legislative power over the regulation of immigration is more
complete than over any other conceivable subject. 18
This power has disparate results in its application. Should these
disparities be addressed when they violate our most basic societal
precepts, particularly equal protection? When dealing with asylum
and refugees, should our values control our policies? To the extent
value judgments are made, how should those who shape immigration
policy consider the implications of those value judgments,
particularly when they may even conflict with our own cultural
values, which by their very nature underlie our own legislative
protections? Finally, to what extent should these decisions be
reconsidered, adapted, and changed as time goes by?
This article addresses these questions with respect to the adoption
and enforcement of per se asylum policies in the United States.
Section II discusses the central concepts of asylum and how they
have evolved in the United States. Section III reviews these
protections as they apply to two different groups who have been
afforded per se asylum protection-Chinese and Cuban nationals.
Section IV discusses the problems that arise when similar social

14.
15.

16.

17.
18.

outburst at the family planning office "as mere disorderly conduct that fell short of the
type offormal and public resistance" required). But see Jia Shan Ou v. Mukasey, 260
F. App'x 371, 372 (2d Cir. 2008) (alluding to the fact that a former husband might be
able to demonstrate past persecution where his wife was sterilized and he was fined,
arrested, detained, and beaten while in custody, but presumption of future persecution
was rebutted because he was divorced and had lived in China for eight years without
incident).
See 8 U.S.C. § I 101 (a)(42)(A) (2006).
"Alien" is defined as "any person not a citizen or national of the United States." Id.
§ I 10 I (a)(3).
Kai Wu Chan v. Reno, 916 F. Supp. 1289, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 34 (1982); United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858,
864 (1982); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954».
LINDA BOSNIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN: DILEMMAS OF CONTEMPORARY
MEMBERSHIP 50 (2006).
Id. (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Shaughnessy v. United States ex
reI. Mezei, 345 U.s. 206, 210 (1953); Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan,
214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909».
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groups are afforded different levels of protection from persecution.
Also, section IV considers whether such protection should be
available at all and offers suggestions on how to better implement per
se asylum protection if this type of preferential asylum method is
retained.
II. ASYLUM, PERSECUTION, AND PROCESS
A. Asylum

Asylum is not a product of the modem age; instead, it is a concept
that has existed for at least 3500 years. 19 However, asylum, as that
term is used today, is different than that of times past, shifting from
"protection from extradition" to a concept that embodies both
political and humanitarian dimensions. 20 Asylum is codified by both
international declaration and domestic law that has been adopted by
the United States. 21 Under international law, those who seek asylum
must establish they are a "refugee," which is defined as a person who
has a
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality [membership in a particular social
group,] or political opinion, [and] is outside the country of
his [or her] nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear
or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling
to avail himself [or herself] of the protection of that country;
19.

20.

21.

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S
REFUGEES: THE CHALLENGE OF PROTECTION 33 (1993). The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees report points to the revocation of the Edicts of Nantes in
1685 as the beginning of the modern tradition of asylum in Europe, but it existed long
before that time. Jd. Despite some shifts prior to the modern era, "asylum continued
to be viewed more as a prerogative of the Sovereign than as an individual right to
protection until the early years of the 20th century." Id.
See id. "The disintegration of the Turkish, Russian, and Austro-Hungarian empires in
the early twentieth century emphasized the international scope of refugee
movements." Maryellen Fullerton, The International and National Protection of
Refugees, in GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE 245, 247 (Hurst
Hannum ed., 4th ed. 2004). As this disintegration occurred, refugees came to be
described in terms of their nationality, "implicitly recognizing that political events had
triggered" their flight. Id.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
NRES/217(IIl) (Dec. 10, 1948). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides that "[e]veryone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum
from persecution." Id.; see also Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat.
102.

654

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 40

or who, not having a nationality and being outside the
country of his [or her] former habitual residence [as a result
of such events], is unable or, owing to such fear or for
reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to
return to it. 22
Persons who qualify as refugees are protected from "refoulment,"
the return of a person to a country where her life or freedom would be
threatened. 23 Thus, in sovereign states that are signatories to the 1951
Refugee Convention 24 or the 1967 Protocol,25 extending asylum to
refugees comports with the principle of nonrefoulment and satisfies a
nation's obligations under those documents. 26 The process and the
manner in which asylum is granted may vary from nation to nation. 27
B. Refugees in the United States
1. Persecution
Under the Immigration and Nationality Ace8 and the Refugee Act
of 1980,29 for a person to receive refugee status, that person must first
22.
23.
24.

25.

26.

27.

28.
29.

G.A. Res. 429 (V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. N1775, at 48
(Dec. 14, 1950).
ld.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. The
United Nations convened a Conference of Plenipotentiaries in Geneva which resulted
in a treaty concerning refugees known as the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees. This covered only those persons who had become refugees as a result of
events occurring before January 1, 1951. ld.
The 1967 Protocol extended coverage to all refugees regardless of when they had
become refugees. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 606
U.N.T.S.267.
The United States was a signatory to the 1967 Protocol, which was codified in the
Refugee Act of 1980. See Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
Technically, asylum alone does not satisfy the United States' obligation of
nonrefoulment because it is discretionary, however, that is why federal law also
provides for restriction of removal under the Immigration and Naturalization Act. §
241(b)(3).
See, e.g., Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (Austl.), available at http://www.comlaw.gov.auJ
(search "Search ID or Current Titles" for "Migration Act 1958"; then follow
"Migration Act 1958" hyperlink); Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, 1993, c. 23
(Eng.), available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1993/23, amended by
Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act, 1996, c. 49 (Eng.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/49; see generally REBECCA WALLACE &
ADELE BROWN, ASYLUM PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY
HANDBOOK (1999).
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006).
Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
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demonstrate past persecution or a well-founded fear of future
persecution. 30 The problem is that "persecution," the touchstone of
asylum claims, is not easily defined. Indeed, the immigration statutes
offer no definition, although courts have tried to define it. 31 At its
heart, persecution presumes punishment in some form. 32 However,
this definition merely provides the context in which conduct must be
examined. It also presumes some level of government approval or
disregard and that such conduct is directed at a protected group. 33
Finally, it presumes that this conduct is not acceptable to other
nation-states in the global community. 34
The Fourth Circuit has found that '" [p]ersecution involves the
infliction or threat of death, torture, or injury to one's person or
freedom'" on account of a protected ground. 35 It is less difficult to
quantify persecution in terms of torture or the threat of death, but it is
more problematic when it involves more discreet forms of
punishment. Thus, persecution has also been identified as "'the
deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage or the
deprivation of liberty, food, housing, employment or other essentials

30.
31.

32.

33.
34.
35.

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
Nikijuluw v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 115, 120 (1st Cir. 2005) (defining past persecution as
"requiring that the totality of a petitioner's experiences add up to more than mere
discomfort, unpleasantness, harassment, or unfair treatment"); see, e.g., Svistun v.
Holder, 354 F. App'x 872, 874 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Yu Zhao v. Gonzales, 404
F.3d 295, 307 (5th Cir. 2005)) (defining persecution as "the infliction of suffering or
harm, under government sanction, under persons who differ in a way regarded as
offensive ... in a manner condemned by civilized governments"); Qiao Hua Li v.
Gonzales, 405 F.3d 171, 177 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Kondakova v. Ashcroft, 383
F.3d 797, 797 (8th Cir. 2004)) (holding that "persecution involves the infliction or
threat of death, torture, or injury to one's person or freedom .... [A]1though the term
'persecution' includes actions less severe than threats to life or freedom, actions must
rise above the level of mere harassment"); Osaghae v. INS, 942 F.2d 1160, 1163 (7th
Cir. 1991); T-Z-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 163, 170-72 (B.LA. 2007) (quoting H.R. REp. No.
95-1452, at 5, as reprinted in 1978 V.S.C.C.A.N 4700, 4704).
See Osaghae, 942 F.2d at 1163. Judge Posner defined persecution as "punishment for
political, religious, or other reasons that our country does not recognize as legitimate."
Id. Similarly, the Fifth Circuit articulated the definition as '''infliction of suffering or
harm, under government sanction, upon persons who differ in a way regarded as
offensive ... in a manner condemned by civilized governments. '" SVistun, 354 F.
App'x at 874 (quoting Zhao, 404 F.3d at 307).
See Pilica v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 941, 950 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing In re Kasinga, 21 1. &
N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.LA. 1996)).
See Svistun, 354 F. App'x at 874 (quoting Yu Zhao, 404 F.3d at 307).
Qiao Hua Li, 405 F.3d at 177 (quoting Kondakova v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 792, 797
(8th Cir. 2004)).
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of life. ",36
However, "mere discomfiture, unpleasantness,
harassment, or unfair treatment" do not rise to the level of
persecution. 37
2. "Government Involvement" in Persecution
In addition to the problem of quantifying sufficient harm, courts
have had to define "government involvement. ,,38 While direct
government action is easily identifiable, courts have also found an
applicant has been persecuted when the harm is inflicted by persons
"the government is unwilling or unable to control," which is a
different matter altogether. 39 The fate of the second claim, involving
nongovernmental conduct, "depends on some showing either that the
alleged persecutors are aligned with the government or that the
government is unwilling or unable to control them.,,40 This subset of
government involvement creates a broader range of potential issues
because it extends from government complicity to government
ineffectiveness.
"In determining whether a government is willing and able to
control persecutors, .. , 'the most telling datum'" is whether there
was "a prompt response by local authorities to prior incidents.,,41 It is
a threefold connection: a recognition of the problem, a willingness to
investigate, and a commitment to prosecute where appropriate. 42 If
there is a willingness to investigate and institute criminal
proceedings, then the requisite connection between government
inaction and fear of future persecution is not present. 43
In Al Khalili v. Holder,44 the asylee claimed previously inflicted
and future threats, including potential honor killings, from his former
wife's family in Jordan. 45 The Sixth Circuit found there was
insufficient evidence to demonstrate the government was unwilling or
unable to control the family members and protect Al Khalili and his

36.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

T-Z-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 170-72 (quoting H.R. REp. No. 95-1452, at 5 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4700, 4708).
Nikijuluw v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 115, 120 (1st Cir. 2005).
See. e.g., Bartesaghi-Lay v. INS, 9 F.3d 819,822 (lOth Cir. 1993).
See. e.g., id
Raza v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 125, 129 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Orelien v. Gonzales, 467
F.3d 67, 71 (Ist Cir. 2006».
Ortiz-Araniba v. Keisler, 505 F.3d 39, 42 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Harutyunyan v.
Gonzales, 421 F.3d 64,68 (1st Cir. 2005».
See id
See id
557 F.3d 429 (6th Cir. 2009).
Id at 436.
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family from hann. 46 However, in In re R_A_,47 the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld an immigration judge's finding
that the Guatemalan government was unwilling or unable to protect a
battered woman from an abusive spouse, where police responded
initially but failed to follow through and a Guatemalan judge told her
he would not interfere in domestic disputes. 48
3.

Persecution of "Particular Social Groups"

Finally, persecution must involve an identifiable group. 49 Under
the 1951 Refugee Convention 50 and the Refugee Act of 1980/' five
specific groups have already been identified as groups who can
satisfy the "on account of' part of the definition of refugee, including
persons who are persecuted on account of race, religion, ethnicity,
nationality, or political opinion. 52 However, the Refugee Act and
Convention also identify "particular social groups" as persons who
may satisfy the "on account of' part of the definition. 53 This is not a
readily identifiable group, but is defined by the circumstances present
at the time of application. 54
Particular social group is defined as individuals who are members
of a group of persons who share a "common, immutable
characteristic." 55 For example, based on this definition, the BIA has
46.

47.

48.
49.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

55.

Id. The Sixth Circuit reached similar conclusions in El Ghorbi v. Mukasey, 281 F.
App'x 514, 517 (6th Cir. 2008) and Kere v. Gonzales, 252 F. App'x 708, 713 (6th Cir.
2007).
22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999), vacated and remanded with stay of
reconsideration, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (Att'y Gen. Jan. 19,2001), remanded by 23 I. &
N. Dec. 694 (Att'y Gen. Jan. 19, 2005), stay lifted and remanded by 24 I. & N. Dec.
629 (Att'y Gen. Sept. 25, 2008).
Id. at 909,911,914.
See id. at 918 (noting four characteristics that are the focus of persecution: race,
religion, nationality, and political opinion).
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,1951,189 U.N.T.S. 137, 152.
Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
Refugee Act of 1980 § 201; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra
note 50, at 152. Gender is notably absent from this broad definition.
Refugee Act of 1980 § 201; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra
note 50, at 152.
Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining that the
determination of what constitutes a "particular social group" depends on the context in
which it is applied).
In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985), modified by In re Mogharrabi,
19 I. & N. Dec. 439 (B.I.A. 1987). The particular group characteristic is not fixed, but
is determined on a case-by-case basis within the parameters of the broader definition.
Id.
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recognized a number of particular social groups for asylum purposes
including Filipinos of mixed Filipino-Chinese ancestry, members of
the Marehan sub clan of Somalia who share ties of kinship and
linguistic commonalities, and persons identified as homosexuals by
the Cuban government. 56 Regardless of the characteristic identified,
it must be one that members of the group either cannot change, or
should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their
individual identities or consciences. 57
In addition to an immutable characteristic, the group identified
must have a level of social visibility or recognition. 58 The lack of
social visibility or recognition was highlighted by the BIA when that
board reviewed a claim that "Guatemalan women who have been
involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe
that women are to live under male domination" was a particular
social group. 59 While accepting that these women shared common
characteristics, the BIA found that those characteristics did not
translate into a societal recognition of this group in Guatemala. 60 The
BIA observed that "the social group concept would virtually swallow
the entire refugee definition if common characteristics, coupled with
a meaningful level of harm, were all that need be shown.,,61 Thus,
tragic circumstances and harm were not a sufficient basis to establish
social visibility or recognition without a more concrete connection to
society as a whole. 62 In re R-A - has had a long, involved history as it
56.

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Department of Homeland Security's Supplemental Brief at 8 n.7, (name redacted)
(B.I.A. Apr. 13,2009) (citing In re V-T-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 792 (B.I.A. 1997); In re
H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337 (B.I.A. 1996); In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819
(B.I.A. 1990)), available at http://graphics8.nytirnes.com/packages/pd£'us/20090716asylum-brief.pdf. Other groups have not satisfied this definition, including Chinese
citizens of low economic status, family members of deserters, and young workingclass males who have not served in the military in EI Salvador. In re R-A-, 22 I. & N.
Dec. 906, 917-18 (B.I.A 1999) (citing Li v. INS, 92 F.3d 985, 987 (9th Cir. 1996); De
Valle v. INS, 901 F.2d 787, 792 (9th Cir. 1990); Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d
1571, 1572 (9th Cir. 1986)), vacated and remanded with stay o/reconsideration, 22 1.
& N. Dec. 906 (Att'y Gen. Jan. 19,2001), remanded by 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (Att'y
Gen. Jan. 19, 2005), stay lifted and remanded by 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (Att'y Gen.
Sept. 25, 2008). However, in these instances, the Ninth Circuit added another
component to the definition of particular social group. The Ninth Circuit required
"the existence of a voluntary associational relationship among the purported
members." Id. at 912.
In re Acosta, 191. & N. Dec. at 233.
In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951,959 (B.LA. 2006).
In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 907.
Id. at 918.
Id. at 919.
Id. at 937-38 (dissenting opinion).
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has bounced between the BIA and the Attorney General. At the heart
of the matter is whether victims of domestic violence who seek
asylum can be recognized as a particular social group. 63 It serves as
an example of how difficult it can be to quantify a particular social
group, and that such a determination must be made in spite of a
tangible harm suffered.
The BIA faced a similar problem when it first addressed China's
population control program in In re Chang. 64 There, the BIA's
failure to find that Chinese couples whose children had been aborted
were entitled to asylum hinged largely on its inability to categorize
the persecution as "on account of' some identified group. 65 The BIA
recognized that individuals who suffered forced abortion were not
singled out--everyone was subject to the same treatment. 66 Thus, the
failure to connect a forced abortion with an identifiable group-whether political opinion or particular social group--was a problem
both with social visibility and an immutable characteristic where the
law was not inherently persecutory on its face. 67 Interestingly, when
Congress chose to recognize this group of persons, those who
suffered forced abortion or involuntary sterilization under coercive
population control, as an identifiable group, it did so based on
political opinion and not based on particular social group. 68
4. Asylum Per Se
Generally, an asylee or refugee must satisfy the burden of proving
that he or she has been persecuted in order to demonstrate eligibility
for asylum. 69 However, not all persons seeking refugee status are
required to satisfy that burden. In some instances, classes of persons
are deemed to satisfy the burden by virtue of their nationality,
ethnicity, or some event or episode they may have suffered. 70 For
example, female Chinese nationals who demonstrate that they have
been subject to a forced abortion and Chinese nationals of either
gender subjected to involuntary sterilization are entitled to a
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

70.

Jd. at 907 (majority opinion).
20 I. & N. Dec. 38,38 (B.I.A. 1989).
Id. at 44.
Jd. at 44-45.
Id. at 45.
See 8 U.S.C. § 110 1(a)(42)(A) (2006).
Contreras-Martinez v. Holder, 346 F. App'x 956, 957 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Naizgi v.
Gonzales, 455 F.3d 484, 486 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that "[a]n alien bears the burden
of proving eligibility for asylum")); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208. 13 (a), (b)(l) (2010).
See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1 10 1(a)(42)(A), 1255.
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presumption that they have been persecuted. 71 These presumptions
have their genesis in legislative action prompted by events that
occurred both in China as well as in the United States.72 Cubans who
arrive on our shores are presumably paroled 73 into this country
without having to demonstrate that they have been persecuted. 74
They are able to skip asylum proceedings in their entirety and apply
for permanent status within a year of arriving. 75

71.

72.

73.

74.

75.

In 1996, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act, which essentially eliminated the requirement that an applicant
must show persecution based on "race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion" as described by the United Nations for
three classes of aliens: (1) those who have "been forced to abort a pregnancy or to
undergo involuntary sterilization"; (2) those who have "been persecuted for failure or
refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population
control program"; and (3) those who have a "well founded fear that [they] will be
forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal,
or resistance." Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-689. Based on the
language in the statute, anyone who falls under one of the three definitions in section
601 can receive asylum in the United States. See id. This is not limited to individuals
from China, even though the vast majority of asylum cases come out of China due to
its population control policy.
See infra Part IV; see also Nicholas D. Kristof, Tiananmen Square, N.Y. TIMES (May
22, 2009), http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/news/internationaVcountriesandterritoriesl
chinaltiananmen-square/index.html.
The Attorney General may ... in his discretion parole into the
United States temporarily under such conditions as he may
prescribe only on a case-by-case basis for urgent humanitarian
reasons or significant public benefit any alien applying for
admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall
not be regarded as an admission ofthe alien ....
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Parole is a form of relief from immigration detention; it is
not a form of relief from removal proceedings, and when the purposes of parole have
been served, the parolee must be returned to custody, and removal proceedings must
continue. Id.
See 8 U.S.c. § 1255. As noted in the introductory example, this class of persons is
given carte blanche admission to the United States based upon their nationality, which
entitles them to a presumption of refugee status and parole into this country. Cuban
immigration to the United States has its roots in "major revolutionary upheaval."
ALEJANDRO PORTES & ROBERT L. BACH, LATIN JOURNEY: CUBAN AND MEXICAN
IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES 84 (1985). While historically there may have
been a justification for this preferential treatment, more than one legal commentator
has noted such justifications have eroded over time while'the policies have remained
largely unchanged. See, e.g., id.; Note, The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966: ;,Mirando
por los Ojos de Don Quijote 0 Sancho Panza?, 114 HARV. L. REv. 902, 907 (2001)
[hereinafter Mirando por los Ojos].
See 8 U.S.c. § 1255.
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Per se asylum provides certain classes of asylum seekers with a
rebuttable presumption of persecution based upon an identifiable
characteristic that is not available to others who seek asylum. 76 Thus,
certain asylum applicants are relieved of the initial burden of
demonstrating persecution and the burden shifts to the government to
demonstrate a lack of persecution. 77

C. Process
Prior to 1980, the admission of refugees was largely unregulated by
Congress. 78 Instead, the President determined which groups of
asylum seekers would be granted admission to the United States. 79
Inherent in this approach was an ethnocentric and politically
motivated judgment as to which groups of persons should be granted
asylum.80 Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980, in part, to act as
an equalizing force in the grant of asylum in the United States, and to
create an "asylum framework based on a principle of

76.
77.

78.

79.

80.

See id. § 1 101 (a)(42).
See Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, III (2d Cir. 2008) (citing 8 C.F.R.
§ l208.l6(b)(l)(ii) (2008) ("If an applicant has established past persecution on
account of one of the protected grounds, the government bears the burden of rebutting
the presumption that the applicant's life or freedom will be threatened in the future by
a preponderance of the evidence.").
Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119
YALE L. J. 458, 503-05 (2009) (explaining that Congress's dissatisfaction with
executive use of parole power to respond to refugee populations in the 1960s and
1970s prompted the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980).
Id. at 505-06. But, Congress acted on an ad hoc basis as well, creating legislation to
benefit deserving groups of refugees as the need arose. See BILL ONG HING, DEFINING
AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 233-35 (2004) (citing the Displaced
Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009; the Refugee Relief Act of
1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400; the Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L.
No. 82-414, § 212, 66 Stat. 163, 188 (1952)) (explaining that the Attorney General
was granted discretionary authority to parole into the United States any alien for
"emergent reasons" or for "reasons deemed strictly in the public interest"). It is worth
noting that these acts were promulgated prior to the United States' assent to the 1967
Protocol.
Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 78, at 506 ("Through the decades of the Cold War, the
Executive used these tools to admit large numbers of refugees fleeing communist
persecution, as well as the governments of the Middle East, thus advancing through
delegated power a particular vision of what constituted a worthy refugee in line with
the President's prevailing foreign policy concerns."); RING, supra note 79, at 238
(noting that the Refugee Act of 1980 removed language favoring those fleeing
communist countries and countries in the Middle East).

662

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 40

nondiscrimination.,,81 The law created two distinct groups of
applicants: those who applied for asylum abroad were designated
refugees for purposes of the asylum process, and those who applied
for asylum after reaching the United States were identified as
"asylees. ,,82 Both groups of applicants seek to be recognized as a
refugee, because that recognition entitles them to asylum protection
in this country. 83 Under the Refugee Act, the total number of
refugees 84 that could be admitted each year was controlled by the
President and Congress. 85 On the other hand, the number of asylees
admitted each year was theoretically unlimited. 86
An asylee who is present in the United States must apply for
asylum within one year of arriving in this country.87 The asylee must
demonstrate that he or she is entitled to asylum on the grounds that
she is a "refugee, defined as one who is "unwilling or unable to
return" home "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion.,,88 If an asylee or refugee
81.

82.
83.

84.
85.
86.

87.

88.

Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 78, at 506 (citing Edward M. Kennedy, Refogee Act of
1980, 15 INT'L MIGRATION REv. 141, 143 (1981) (noting that the Act ensured refuge
applied not only to refugees from communism or certain areas of the Middle East, but
also to all who met the standard for refugee under the Refugee Convention and
Protocol).
HING, supra note 79, at 238.
8 U.S.C. §§ lI01(a)(42)(A), I 158(b)(1)(A) (2006); see also 8 C.F.R. §208.13 (2010)
(stating that a claim of past persecution requires that an applicant demonstrate that she
has suffered persecution in the past "on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, and is unable or
unwilling to return to ... that country").
The term "refugees" refers to those persons who seek asylum while abroad. See
HING, supra note 79, at 238.
Id.
Id. Hing notes that "until the 1990s, no more than 5,000 asylum applications were
approved each year, usually less than a third of all applications." Id. These numbers
improved through the 1990s and asylum was granted to applicants from countries
beyond the traditional communist bloc and the Middle Eastern countries, although
those historically preferred applicants still dominated the asylum landscape. Id. at
239.
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B); 8 C.F.R. § l208.4(a)(2)(i)(A). Note that the one-year
deadline may be extended if there are changed circumstances that materially affect the
applicant's eligibility for asylum, or other extraordinary circumstances related to the
delay. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D); see also Svistun v. Holder, 354 F. App'x 872, 87374 (5th Cir. 2009).
8 U.S.C. §§ 110 1(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(A). A claim of past persecution requires that
an applicant demonstrate that she has suffered persecution in the past "on account of
race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion, and is unable or unwilling to return to ... that country." 8 C.F.R. § 208.13.
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is granted asylum, it is effective for an indefinite period, but it is not
permanent and remains subject to termination. 89 However, an asylee
or refugee who is granted asylum may apply for permanent residency
after one year. 90
III. EVOLUTION OF TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO
ASYLUM CLAIMS
After the Refugee Act of 1980 was enacted, asylum was granted,
for the most part, on a case-by-case basis if an applicant
demonstrated the requisite persecution or well-founded fear of
persecution. 91 But some groups were entitled to a presumption in
favor of a finding of asylum. 92 Two of these groups continue to
receive the benefit of asylum per se, in the form of a rebuttable
presumption of persecution or in the form of parolee status upon
arrival on our shores. The first group, Chinese nationals who claim
they were subject to "coercive population control" in their home
89.

90.

91.

92.

8 U.S.C. § 1158(c)(2) (providing that asylum may be terminated when there is a
fundamental change in circumstances, including something that would have excepted
an alien from asylum initially, or when the alien receives protection from a third
country or the alien's own country); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.l4(e). Asylum can be
terminated if the recipient no longer has a fear of persecution or there is a change in
circumstances relating to the original claim, where the alien's life or freedom no
longer would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion in the country from which deportation or
removal was withheld. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.24.
INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1999) (citing INS v. CardozaFonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428-29 n.6 (1987)).
See 8 U.S.C. §§ l101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(A). Recent cases continue to apply the
same standard. See, e.g., Sugiarto v. Holder, 586 F.3d 90, 92-93 (1st Cir. 2009)
(denying asylum to a Christian in Indonesia, who was robbed at work in a mall during
a bomb threat and lived in an area where churches were being bombed because
persecution against Christians in Indonesia did not rise to the level of a "pattern or
practice"); Melaj v. Mukasey, 282 F. App'x 354, 355-56, 360 (6th Cir. 2008)
(granting an Albanian policeman who refused to obey an order to fire upon
demonstrators protesting the previous Democratic government in 1996 asylum
because he suffered past persecution by being detained, tortured, and hunted by
Albanian police officers within his own country); Ahmed v. Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183,
1188-89, 1194 (9th Cir. 2007) (granting asylum to a Bihari based on political opinion
after he and others refused Bengali citizenship, and the Bengali government removed
them from their homes, confiscated their property, and relocated them to resettlement
camps); Mamouzian v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 1129, 1132, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 2004)
(granting asylum because petitioner was beaten, jailed, and threatened by Armenian
government officials that she would be jailed or killed in retaliation for her political
expression if she continued to speak out against corruption in the ruling party).
See 8 U.S.C. § I 101 (a)(42).
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country, are entitled to a rebuttable presumption that they were
persecuted if they have undergone a forced abortion or involuntary
sterilization. 93 The second group, Cuban nationals who arrive on
U.S. shores, are routed around the asylum process entirely and are
fast tracked to parole status and potential citizenship upon arriving on
U.S. shores. 94
A. China

Chinese nationals became beneficiaries of per se asylum legislation
in 1996 as part of an amendment to the Refugee Act of 1980. 95
Congress acted in response to pressure from both Chinese refugee
groups as well as prolife advocates who criticized local practices in
China of forced abortion and involuntary sterilization to enforce
population control policies. 96
China's One Child, One Family policy was part of a broader
economic development policy.97 As early as 1965, Zhou Enlai called
for a reduction in the annual rate of population growth. 98 The policy
93.
94.

95.

96.
97.

98.

See id.; supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
See 8 U.S.c. § 1255; Mirando par los Ojos, supra note 74, at 906. In September
1994, the United States and Cuba agreed to direct Cuban migration into safe, legal,
and orderly channels, and to regularly review the migration situation and
implementation of the accords. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, FACT SHEET: CUBA-U.S.
MIGRATION ACCORD (2000) [hereinafter FACT SHEET: CUBA-U.S. MIGRATION
ACCORD], available at http://www.state.gov/www/regions/whaicubalfs_000828_
migration_accord.html. The United States committed to process a minimum of
20,000 Cuban migrants each year, and Cuba pledged to discourage irregular and
unsafe departures. Id.
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, § 601(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-689 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
110 1(a)(42)). Although this group of potential refugees had received enhanced
consideration from our government on the basis of forced abortion and involuntary
sterilization as early as 1990, legislation failed before finally becoming codified in
1996. Policy Implementation with Respect to Nationals of the People's Republic of
China, Exec. Order No. 12711,55 Fed. Reg. 13897 (April 11, 1990).
HING, supra note 79, at 256.
In re Chang, 20 1. & N. Dec. 38,41 n.2 (B.1.A. 1989); see also Tyrene White, Two
Kinds of Production: The Evolution of China's Family Planning Policy in the 1980s,
20 POPULATION & DEV. REv. (SuPP.) 137, 137 (1994). "After years of resisting the
view held widely outside China that the PRC had to take steps to limit the growth of
its population, ... the post-Mao reform leadership decided to institute family planning
programs." In re Chang, 20 1. & N. Dec. at 46 n.2. China's leaders believed that
"economic modernization goals [would] be unattainable without a low birth rate." Id.;
see also W X Zhu, The One Child Family Policy, 88 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD
463, 463-64 (2003), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/artic1es/
PMCI763112/pdflv088p00463.pdf.
White, supra note 97, at 141.
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was fIrst introduced in 1979 with the idea that it would be a shortterm solution as the country shifted its cultural bias toward a
voluntary small-family society.99 The underlying goal, in addition to
population control, was to improve the standard of living among rural
residents as a part of broader economic growth. 100
However, the push to control population growth did not originate in
China; instead, western countries had been pushing China to take
steps to control population growth for several years based on
projections of China's potential for overwhelming growth. 101

1. China's Population Control Policy
The State Family Planning Bureau sets overall targets and policies
for population control, which are then carried out by local
committees. 102 Women are required to be twenty years of age in
order to marry; men must be twenty-two years of age. 103 The
regulations include restrictions on family size, late childbearing, and
spacing of children when a second or third child is permitted. 104
Enforcement is strict but uneven; a second child is allowed under
certain circumstances and is more common in rural areas. 105 The
99.

100.

101.
102.
103.

104.

105.

Therese Hesketh et aI., The Effect a/China's One-Child Family Policy after 25 Years,
353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1171, 1171 (2005). China approached its goal with education,
contraceptive counseling, free contraceptive devices, and economic and social
incentives and disincentives. In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 41 n.2. The State
Council approved the "one is best, two at most" birth-control-policy slogan and
rewarded couples for limiting themselves to one child while penalizing others for
three or more births with fines and other economic sanctions. White, supra note 97, at
143. This shifted to more universal enforcement in the early 1980s and then a
relaxation of goals in the late 1980s followed by an increase in rhetoric and a move
for strict family planning in the 19908. Id. at 154.
White, supra note 97, at 145.
In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 44.
Hesketh et aI., supra note 99, at 1171.
BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2009
HUMAN RiGHTS REpORT: CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, HONG KONG AND MACAU) (2010),
available at http://www.state.gov/gldrllrislhrrptl2009/eap/135989.htm [hereinafter
2009 HUMAN RiGHTS REpORT: CHINA].
Hesketh et aI., supra note 99, at 1171.
Id.; 2009 HUMAN RiGHTS REpORT: CHINA, supra note 103.
The law . . . allows eligible couples to apply for permission to
have a second child if they meet conditions stipulated in local and
provincial regulations. The one-child limit [is] more strictly
applied in urban areas . . .. In most rural areas, the policy was
more relaxed, with couples permitted to have a second child in
cases where the first child was a girl.
2009 HUMAN RiGHTS REpORT: CHINA, supra note 103.
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system has rewards and penalties. Rewards include health and
education benefits, and in some limited instances cash rewards or
paid time off to recover. 106 Official penalties include fines and
dismissal from work. 107 Each person in a couple that has an
unapproved child is required by law to pay a "'social compensation
fee,' which can reach [ten] times a person's annual disposable
income." 108
The Chinese central government has long denied supporting any
use of force to obtain compliance with birth quotas, but there is
evidence that citizens, particularly in rural areas, have been subject to
involuntary sterilization and forced abortion in the past. 109 A recent
study indicated that with respect to women of reproductive age, 25%
of women have had at least one abortion, both voluntary and
forced. 110 While the incidence of forced abortion seems to be less
than in previous years, the most recent State Department country
report still reflects the existence of forced abortions. III In recent
106.

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

In re Chang, 201. & N. Dec. at 40-41. The Chinese government puts intense pressure
on local birth-planning officials to meet birth-limitation targets. This pressure results
in instances of physical coercion used to compel persons to submit to abortion or
sterilization procedures. HUMAN RIGHTS REpORT: CHINA, supra note 103. The One
Child, One Family policy has led to families' use of ultrasound technology to identify
female fetuses and terminate the pregnancy. Although this practice is illegal in China,
the birth limitations, as well as the traditional preference for male children,
particularly in rural areas, has led to a government-estimated 120 males born for every
100 females at the end of2007. This number is alarming when compared to the norm
of 103 to 107 males for every 100 females. Id. The One Child, One Family policy
along with this traditional preference for male children continues after birth as a state
media report stated, "infant mortality rates in rural areas were 27 percent higher for
girls than boys and that neglect was one factor in the lower survival rate." BUREAU OF
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS
REpORT: CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, HONG KONG, AND MACAU) (2009), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drVrlslhrrptl2008/eapl1l9037.htm.
See In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 40-41.
2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REpORT: CHINA, supra note 103.
See In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 40-41.
Hesketh et aI., supra note 99, at 1172. By comparison, 43% of women of
reproductive age in the United States have had an abortion. Id.
2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REpORT: CHINA, supra note 103. The 2010 Human Rights Report
on China stated,
Regulations requiring women who violate family-planning
policy to terminate their pregnancies still exist in the 25th, 42nd,
and 22nd provisions of the Population and Family Control
Regulation of Liaoning, Jilin, and Heilongjiang provinces,
respectively. An additional 10 provinces-Fujian, Guizhou,
Guangdong, Gansu, Jiangxi, Qinghai, Sichuan, Shanxi, Shaanxi,
and Yunnan-require unspecified 'remedial measures' to deal
with unauthorized pregnancies ...
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years, enforcement of certain aspects of the population-control policy
has been relaxed. Couples are not forced to obtain permission to
have their first child and may often obtain permission for a second
child. 112 As a practical matter, economic disincentives have not been
as effective as imagined, and increased freedom of movement makes
it more difficult to track down violators. 113
2. China's Population Control Policy Becomes Persecution.
China's population control policy, including local enforcement
through forced abortion and involuntary sterilization, was in place for
approximately seven years before the BIA addressed the issue of
whether such a policy could serve as a basis for asylum. 114 In May
1989, the BIA held that China's One Couple, One Child policy was
not, on its face, persecutive and did not create a well-founded fear of
persecution, even to the extent that involuntary sterilization might
occur. 115 The BIA based its decision largely on the fact that the
policy did not single out an identifiable group. 116 The BIA did not
address whether the policy was appropriate or whether it should be
"encouraged or discouraged," focusing instead on whether the

112.
113.
114.
115.

116.

BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RiGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2010
HUMAN RIGHTS REpORT: CHINA (INCLUDES TIBET, HONG KONG AND MACAU) (2011),
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drVrlslhrrptl2010/eap/154382.htm.
See Hesketh et aI., supra note 99, at 1171, 1174-75.
Id. at 1175.
In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 38.
Id. at 44. Chang, a thirty-three-year-old citizen of the People's Republic of China,
sought asylum and withholding of deportation. Id. at 39. He did not raise any claims
about China's family planning policy until his deportation hearing. Id. At that time,
he claimed that he and his wife had to flee their commune because they had two
children and did not agree to stop having children, and that "they disagreed with
China's family planning policies because 'in the countryside, especially in farming
areas, we need more children. '" Id. He also testified that he was afraid if he returned
to China, he would be required to undergo sterilization. Id. On appeal, Chang further
explained that he was ordered to undergo sterilization and that he fled China because
he had no other choice. Id.
See id. at 43-44. The BIA did not preclude any potential claim based upon
persecution related to China's coercive family planning policy. Id. at 44. Instead, it
held that an applicant must establish that the "application of the policy to him was in
fact persecutive or that he had a well-founded fear" he would be persecuted on
account of race, religion, national origin, particular social group, or political opinion.
Id. The BlA explained that an application of the facially neutral policy had to be
otherwise persecutive. Id. at 45.
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applicant met the definition of refugee as a separate matter. 117 As
applied to Chang, the BIA found that he did not satisfy the
definition. 118
Less than a month later, protestors seeking democratic reform
entered Tiananmen Square. 119 Chinese students and citizens rallied in
support of those protesting in Tiananmen Square. 120 Many Chinese
citizens who were not part of the formal protest were shot and killed
by members of the Chinese Army in the surrounding streets,
seemingly without provocation. 121 Tanks rolling into Tiananmen
killed bystanders and protesters alike, leaving a pile of crushed and
crumpled bodies in their wake. 122
In response, the United States government sought to offer
protection to those who had openly opposed China's government. 123
Population control, a policy that had largely escaped political scrutiny
in the United States just a year earlier, was recast based on public
perception of the horrible human-rights abuses by China. 124 On April
11, 1990, President George H.W. Bush issued Executive Order
12711, which directed the Attorney General and the Secretary of
State to exercise their authority under the Immigration and
Nationality Act to protect citizens of the Peoples' Republic of China
who were currently present in the United States so that they were not

117.

Id. at 47. The BIA also suggested that choosing to afford protection to those subject
to mandatory sterilization under China's family-planning policy was a legislative
matter. Id.
118. Id. Arguably, the BIA was focused solely on whether the applicant could satisfy the
requisite test, not whether the underlying claim had some political currency in this
country. See id.
119. Kristof, supra note 72.
120. Id.
121. Mengbai Zhong, White Dawn, CHINA NEWS DIGEST (June 8, 1999),
http://museums.cnd.orglCND-GlobaIlCND-Globa1.99.2ndlCND-Globa1.99-0607.html. Zhong and his friend, Yefu took to the streets on the eve of June 3, 1989, to
witness and document what was happening. Id. Zhong writes of being repeatedly
shot at by the Chinese Army for nonviolent protests, seeing many bodies and injured
citizens, and witnessing the tanks entering Tiananmen Square. Id.
122. Id.
123. Exec. Order No. 12711,55 Fed. Reg. 13897 (Apr. 11, 1990). "In response to a foreign
crisis, the President can authorize the entry of particular groups or extend temporary
protection to members of such groups who may already be in the United States...."
Kai Wu Chan v. Reno, 916 F. Supp. 1289, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing 8 U.S.c. §§
1157, 1182(f) (2006».
124. See Jacques de Lisle, Human Rights, Civil Wrongs and Foreign Relations: A

"Sinical" Look at the Use of us. Litigation to Address Human Rights Abuses
Abroad, 52 DEPAULL. REv. 473, 481-82 (2002).
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forced to return to China. 125 President Bush also directed that
"enhanced consideration" be given to individuals from "any country"
who expressed a fear of persecution upon return to their country
related to that country's policy of forced abortion. 126 While the
events of May 1990 were not connected to China's population control
policy, the President took the opportunity to address the very same
policy that had been at issue in the BIA's decision in In re Chang.
In this political atmosphere, Congress amended the Refugee Act of
1980 to specifically provide that a person who was subject to
persecution for resistance to a coercive popUlation control (CPC)
program was eligible for asylum.127 This new protection was a result,
at least in part, of a coalition of Chinese asylum supporters and rightto-life proponents. 128 Congress created recognition for two new
groups of refugees. First, Congress afforded per se status to any
person who had suffered forced abortion or sterilization. 129 These
asylum applicants did not have to prove any resistance or opposition
to a CPC program beyond being involuntarily aborted or sterilized. 130
Congress also afforded protection to persons who were subject to
persecution for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure, were
subject to persecution for other resistance to a CPC program, or who
held a well-founded fear of future persecution for one of these

125. Exec. Order No. 12711,55 Fed. Reg. 13897 (Apr. 11, 1990).
126. Id.
127. 8 u.s.c. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2006). The statute provides that
a person who has been forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo
involuntary sterilization, or who has been persecuted for failure or
refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance to a
coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have
been persecuted on account of political opinion, and a person who
has a well founded fear that he or she will be forced to undergo
such a procedure or subject to persecution for such failure, refusal,
or resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded fear of
persecution on account of political opinion.
Id. Initially, asylum was limited to 10,000 applicants per year under this per se
protection, but that numerical limit was removed in 2005 when the REAL ID ACT
was passed. See 8 U.S.C. § 115 (2006).
128. HINo, supra note 79, at 256.
129. See 8 U.S.c. § 1l01(a)(42)(A)-(B). While the language of the statute did not limit
itself to Chinese nationals, as a practical matter, Chinese nationals are the only group
that seek asylum under these provisions. See Kyle R. Rabkin, The Zero-Child Policy:
How the Board of Immigration Appeals Discriminates Against Unmarried AsylumSeekers Fleeing Coercive Family Planning Measures, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 965, 966
(2007).
130. See 8 U.S.C. § 1l01(a)(42)(A)-(B).
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reasons. 131 Congress enacted this legislation in direct response to the
BIA's decision in In re Chang. 132
Almost immediately, the BIA determined that the new per se
protection offered to victims of coercive physical procedures could
be extended to a victim's spouse. 133 The extended protection arose
out of a concession by the Immigration and Naturalization Services
(INS) that spouses of victims of forced abortions or sterilizations
were allowed to stand in the shoes of those victims for asylum
purposes. 134 The BIA then completely refused to extend this
preferred status to fathers of aborted unborn children where the father
and mother were not in a legally recognized marriage. 135
From 1997 to 2007, federal courts followed this interpretation of
section 1101(a)(42)(A),136 although it was frequently questioned.137
The courts struggled to apply the statute to other situations,
particularly those involving men who were not in legally recognized
marriages, because the underlying basis for the BIA's decision was
never clearly explained. 138 The Seventh and Ninth Circuit Courts of
Appeals took issue with the BIA's bright-line rule and extended the
per se presumption to a divorced male asylee whose unborn child had
been forcibly aborted and to a male asylee who had participated in a
traditional marriage because China's population-control program

131. Id.; In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915 (B.I.A. 1997).
132. In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 922. In re Chang was then superseded by the BIA's
decision in In re X-P-T-, where the BIA recognized that an alien who has been forced
to abort a pregnancy, undergo involuntary sterilization, or been persecuted for
resistance to coercive population control has suffered past persecution on account of
political opinion, and qualifies as a refugee. Id. at 917.
133. See id. at 918-19.
134. Id. at 917-18.
135. See Kui Rong Ma v. Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 553, 557 (9th Cir. 2004). Marriages in China
must be registered to be recognized. Id. Many marriages are not registered because
the couple is not yet old enough to marry under the marriage law. Id. Thus, the
couple may choose to be married in a traditional ceremony, but the Chinese
government will not recognize the marriage as valid until the couple is the appropriate
age and registered. Id.
136. See In re J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520 (Att'y Gen. 2008); Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 416 F.3d 184, 187-88 (2d Cir. 2005).
137. See, e.g., Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 399-405 (2d Cir.
2007) (en bane); Junshao Zhang v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 993, 999 (7th Cir. 2006); Shi
Liang Lin, 416 F.3d at 187; Kui Rang Ma, 361 F.3d at 559-61.
138. See, e.g., Cai Luan Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221,225 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that
BIA did not offer a basis for concluding that spouses were entitled to per se protection
from coercive family planning).
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would not permit the applicant and his fiance to marry based on their
age. 139
In 2007, the interpretation of section 1l01(a)(42)(A) shifted again.
The Second Circuit remanded a case back to the BIA to explain its
position that husbands of women who were forcibly aborted or
sterilized were entitled to per se asylum but unmarried partners of
those women were not. 140 When the case returned to the Second
Circuit, the court, sitting en banc, held that the statute was not
ambiguous and it clearly applied only to the victim of forced abortion
or sterilization. 141 In June 2008 the Attorney General weighed in,
taking the position that applicants who did not themselves suffer a
forced abortion or sterilization must demonstrate persecution on the
basis of other resistance on a case-by-case basis. 142
Since that time, the BIA and most circuit courts have refused to
consider the abortion or sterilization of a man's wife or mother of his
unborn child when considering his asylum claim. 143 Instead, the BIA
and the courts have looked at two things: whether the applicant can
demonstrate "resistance," and whether the applicant suffered
persecution on account of that resistance. 144 Thus, where it would
once perhaps have been appropriate to consider an applicant's
connection to a forced abortion or sterilization, this swing in policy
has meant that applicants must stand solely on their own experience,
even under circumstances where their future child has been aborted.
Courts are, in essence, bifurcating claims of persecution and
refusing to consider the abortion of a male applicant's unborn child in
conjunction with any other resistance. 145 In Ming Shi Chen v. Bd. of

139. Junshao Zhang, 434 F.3d at 999 (citing Kui Rong Ma, 361 F.3d at 559-61). But see
Cai Luan Chen, 381 F.3d at 232-34 (holding that unmarried partners are not entitled
to per se protection, even when prevented from marrying by family-planning policy).
140. Shi Liang Lin, 416 F.3d at 192.
141. Shi Liang Lin, 494 F.3d at 299-305.
142. In re J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520, 523 (Att'y Gen. 2008).
143. See, e.g., Shun Guan Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 366 F. App'x 272, 274 (2d CiT.
2010) (holding that helping his wife hide to avoid a forced abortion and his payment
of a fine did not rise to the level of persecution); Yue Ping Lin v. Holder, 359 F.
App'x 230, 232 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that Lin failed to establish that he suffered
any independent, personal persecution qualifying him for relief).
144. See, e.g., Jia Duan Dong v. Holder, 587 F.3d 8,12 (1st Cir. 2009).
145. See, e.g., Hao Zhu v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 316, 323 (7th CiT. 2006) (Rovner, J.,
dissenting). The dissent in Zhu astutely noted that "the forced abortion inflicted upon
Zhu's partner may not be a fact that entitles Zhu to a per se presumption of past
persecution ... but neither can it be ignored as though it were entirely umelated to the
persecution at issue." Id.; see also Zhi Zhi Chen v. Gonzales, 152 F. App'x 528, 530
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Immigration Appeals, the Second Circuit held that "the fact that an
individual's spouse or partner has been forced to have an abortion
'does not, on its own, constitute resistance to coercive family
planning policies. ",146 However, in Jia Shan Ou v. Mukasey, the
Second Circuit seemed to indicate that Ou, a former husband could
demonstrate past persecution where his wife was sterilized but only
because he was himself fined, arrested, detained, and beaten while in
custody, even though Ou was ultimately denied asylum based on the
fact he was now divorced and had lived in China for eight years
without incident. 147
The BIA has held that the tenn "'resistance' includes, but is not
limited to, 'expressions of general opposition, attempts to interfere
with enforcement of government policy ... and other overt forms of
resistance to the requirements of the family planning law. '" 148 But it
is telling what courts found to not constitute resistance. For example,
impregnating one's girlfriend, in direct contravention of China's
family planning policy, is not resistance. 149 This is presumably
because the applicant cannot demonstrate it was intentional and not
just an accident. Had it been a purposeful impregnation in protest of
population-control policy, then it would seem to most certainly
satisfy the concept of "overt form[] of resistance to the requirements
of [] family planning.,,15o Also, failure to surrender one's girlfriend
or wife voluntarily is not resistance because hiding is not an overt
fonn of resistance. lSI In Bi Qi Liu v. Holder, the Second Circuit held
that in order to demonstrate persecution, a father would have to
demonstrate he was "arrested, mistreated, or physically harmed.,,152
So, even if a male applicant could demonstrate resistance, absent his

146.
147.

148.

149.
150.
151.
152.

(7th Cir. 2005) (discussing the different approaches to male applicants whose partners
have been subject to a forced abortion).
Ming Shi Chen v. B.I.A.. 247 F. App'x 304, 305 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Shi Liang
Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 313 (2d Cir. 2007)).
See Jia Shan au v. Mukasey, 260 F. App'x 371, 372-73 & 373 n.2 (2d Cir. 2008).
This means Ou was unable to receive asylum based on past persecution alone. See id.
at 372. The wisdom ofthis position is questionable, considering that those who abort
and do not attempt to have more children will not be subject to future persecution.
Xiao Fei Dong v. Mukasey, 307 F. App'x 547, 549 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting In re
S-L-L, 24 I. & N. Dec. 1, 10 (B.LA. 2006)). However, in 2005, the Third Circuit
found that the standard was met where a doctor wrote articles critical of birth control
measures and publicized a practice of hospital infanticide. Yun Jun Cao v. Att'y Gen.
of the U.S., 407 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 2005).
Cheng Lin v. Holder, 314 F. App'x 371, 372 (2d Cir. 2009).
Xiao Fei Dong, 307 F. App'x at 549.
See id.
Bi Qi Liu v. Holder, 349 F. App'x 664, 665 (2d Cir. 2009).
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arrest or some physical harm to his own person, it would appear that
he can never demonstrate he has been persecuted when his child is
forcibly aborted. IS3 Today, this application of asylum statutes
remains the status quo with respect to Chinese men. IS4
B.

Cuba and the Cuban Acijustment Act

In 1959, Fulgencio Batista was overthrown in a coup orchestrated
by Fidel Castro and Emesto "Che" Guevara. 155 Castro's rise to
power marked the beginning of communism and the end of
democratic freedoms for this U.S. island neighbor; it also marked
mass Cuban migration to the United States. 156 The first waves of
Cuban refugees were comprised of predominately white or Latino,
educated, landowners and their families who were directly affected
by Cuba's shifting political landscape. 157
Legislation protecting Cubans who might have otherwise entered
the United States illegally was first passed in 1966 in response to this
mass migration. 158 The Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 provided a
separate mechanism by which Cuban entrants could secure the right
to permanent residence in the United States. 1S9 The Act provides, in
pertinent part, that

153. See id.
154. See, e.g., Shun Guan Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 366 F. App'x 272, 274 (2d Cir.

155.
156.
157.

158.
159.

2010); Yue Ping Lin v. Holder, 359 F. App'x 230, 231-32 (2d Cir. 2010); Jia Duan
Dong v. Holder, 587 F.3d 8, 11-12 (1st Cir. 2009); Xiao Fei Dong, 307 F. App'x at
549; Cheng Lin, 314 F. App'x at 372; Bi Qi Liu, 349 F. App'x at 665.
Roland Estevez, Note, Modern Application of the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 and
Helms-Burton: Adding Insult to Injury, 20 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1273,1273-74 (2002).
Id. at 1274 (citing PORTES & BACH, supra note 74, at 85).
Id. These immigrants have been identified as arriving in three distinct stages-ofthose
arriving between 1959 and 1973, most moved freely, either by permission or
agreement of the Cuban and United States governments. See id. Just under one
million immigrants arrived from Cuba during this time period. See id.
Pub. L. No. 89-732, 80 Stat. 1161 (1966) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255
(2006)).
Id. At the outset of this discussion, the difference in statutory mechanisms employed
to resolve the issue of Cuban migration must be noted. Cubans, unlike Chinese
victims of coercive population control, are not granted a presumption of persecution
during asylum proceedings. See Estevez, supra note 155, at 1290-91. Instead, there
is a separate system in place that offers Cuban nationals who enter our country in a
similar manner, and arguably for similar reasons, far more immediate protection than
those who seek asylum. See id. at 1292. However, while acknowledging these
distinctions, the larger conversation about treatment of groups of asylum seekers is
still a valid undertaking. See id. at 1292-95.
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the status of any alien who is a native or citizen of Cuba and
who has been inspected and admitted or paroled into the
United States subsequent to January 1, 1959 and has been
physically present in the United States for at least one year,
may be adjusted by the Attorney General, in his
discretion ... to that of an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence if the alien makes an application for
such adjustment, and the alien is eligible to receive an
immigrant visa and is admissible to the United States for
permanent residence. 160
Because Cubans are generally paroled into the United States, they
can take advantage of this provision and are not required to
demonstrate they suffered persecution or otherwise satisfy the
definition of refugee. 161
Cubans who reach United States soil are generally paroled into the
United States. 162 Once present in the United States for the requisite
time, a Cuban may seek to adjust his or her status to that of a
permanent resident. 163 Even Cubans who attempt to reach the United
States through the Florida Straits and are interdicted are entitled to
have their asylum claims heard, but are not automatically entitled to
parole in the United States. 164 Still, they are more likely to have their
asylum claims granted than Haitians or other Caribbean nationals. 165
No other group of aliens is afforded such preferential status.
In 1980, there was a shift in immigration flow from Cuba, marked
by the Carter Administration's invitation to Cubans seeking refuge to
160. 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006).
161. Mirando par los Ojos, supra note 74, at 906-07.
162. See id. at 907.
In September 1994 the United States and Cuba agreed to direct
Cuban migration into safe, legal and orderly channels, and to
regularly review the migration situation and implementation of the
accords .... The U.S. committed to process a minimum of20,000
Cuban migrants each year. [And,] Cuba pledged to discourage
irregular and unsafe departures.
FACT SHEET: CUBA-U.S. MIGRATION ACCORD, supra note 94.
163. See 8 U.S.c. § 1255.
164. See Donald Brown, Comment, Crooked Straits: Maritime Smuggling of Humans from
Cuba to the United States, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 273, 277 (2002).
165. See Arteaga, supra note 10, at 510-11, 541 (noting instances where Haitians,
Jamaicans, and Cubans in similar circumstances are treated differently, even where all
of them reach United States soil). The United States' policy with respect to Cuba
became heavily criticized in the latter part of the twentieth century, particularly as it
was compared to the treatment of Haitians seeking asylum. Cox & Rodriguez, supra
note 78, at 507.
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come to the United States. 166 The "Marielitos,,,167 as they came to be
known, included Cubans who were economically, ethnically, and
socially distinct from those who emigrated in the early years of
Castro's political regime. 168
For the most part, the United States continued to accept Cuban
refugees freely, and those refugees continued to receive the benefits
of the Cuban Adjustment Act until 1994. 169 At that time, Cuba and
the United States formalized a process 170 by which Cubans interdicted
at sea could be returned to Cuba or held at Guantanamo Bay, and a
limited number of Cubans would be permitted to immigrate directly
from Cuba. 171 Those who reached the United States, on the other
hand, had reached a sanctuary from exile and deportation. The at-sea
interdiction policy, which is still in force today, is designated "wet
foot, dry foot" based on the disparate treatment afforded successful
escapees from those interdicted at sea. 172
IV. CULTURE, POLICY, BACKLASH, AND VALUE
JUDGMENTS.
Assessing the impact of per se asylum preferences requires an
examination of the underlying cultural and policy implications this
166. Estevez, supra note 155, at 1275. This policy was known as "open hearts and open
anns" policy. PORTES & BACH, supra note 74, at 87. In April 1980, over 150,000
Cubans boarded boats in Mariel Harbor and journeyed to the United States. Cox &
Rodriguez, supra note 78, at 507.
167. They were known as MarieJitos because the port was their point of departure from
Cuba. Estevez, supra note 155, at 1275.
168. HING, supra note 79, at 257. In fact, many Marielitos "initially explained their
departure as the result of food scarcity, or the desire to earn more money in the United
States." Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 78, at 507.
169. See Estevez, supra note 155, at 1275-76.
170. Id.
171. FACT SHEET: CUBA-U.S. MIGRATION ACCORD,supra note 94.
172. Id. The shift from "open hearts" to "at-sea interdiction" was a slow one, and was
marked more by external forces than the reality that the type of refugee fleeing Cuba
had changed. See Alberto J. Perez, Wet Foot, Dry Foot, No Foot: The Recurring
Controversy Between Cubans, Haitians, and the United States Immigration Policy, 28
NOVA L. REv. 437, 445 (2004). In the 1980s and 1990s there was a general public
outcry of the disparate treatment of Haitians and Cubans who arrived in the United
States. ld. at 454-55. That, in addition to waning public support for the continued
migration of Cubans to South Florida, are the predominant reasons the shift occurred.
Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 78, at 508-09. Even with this movement, Cubans still
receive preferential treatment-both at sea and once they arrive in our borders. See
Stephen H. Legornsky, The USA and the Caribbean Interdiction Program, 18 INT'L J.
REFUGEE L. 677, 684 (2006). Unlike Haitians, "Cubans who are interdicted at sea are
advised of their right to apply for asylum." Id.
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type of protection affords. The universal definition of refugee is
highly politicized, based on a Eurocentric-type refugee, to the
detriment of a broader class of refugees from less-developed
nations. 173 This definition favors asylum seekers fleeing communist
regimes to the detriment of Third World refugees, whose "flight
[was] more often prompted by natural disaster, war, or broadly-based
political and economic turmoil than by 'persecution,' at least as that
term is understood in the European context.,,174 To some extent, this
illustrates why Cubans receive preferential treatment while the plight
of Haitian refugees avoiding political upheaval, natural disasters, and
economic deprivation has caused the United States to reach out
beyond its borders to prevent an influx of asylees from that country.
The nations that decide who is a refugee for purposes of asylum
make value judgments. These value judgments are rife with our own
cultural views about immigration, poverty, politics, war, and socially
charged issues such as abortion, domestic violence, and race. 175
"Even in the area of asylum, our policies are implemented in ways
that are not generous toward those who would not fit the real image
of who an American is.,,176 Lost in the inherent definition of refugee
is the idea that those who are persecuted-for whatever reasonshould be afforded asylum.177 Thus, the definition should be read
more fully than it currently is in many countries, including the United
States. The problem is that while targeted legislation can fill gaps in
the definition of refugee, too often such legislation reinforces
disparities in the treatment of those who seek asylum. 178
In the United States, these definitions and concepts-who is a
refugee, who is entitled to presumptive asylum, and who is entitled to
parole without proof-must be balanced with our notion of "equal
protection." 179 Equal protection mandates that determinations of
asylum should require that '" distinctions between different classes of
173. Nessel, supra note 7, at 635.
174. James C. Hathaway, A Reconsideration of the Underlying Premise ofRefugee Law, 31
HARv. INT'L L.J. 129, 162 (1990).
175. See HING, supra note 79, at 257.
176. Id.
177. See, e.g., Refugee Act of1980, 96-212, § 201, 94 Stat. 102, 102 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(2006».
178. See HING, supra note 79, at 257-58.
179. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886). In some ways this is an
oversimplification of a complex issue. For the purposes of this discussion, the
concept of "equal protection" refers broadly to the legal concept our country has
embraced in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
at the macro level and has applied judicially and legislatively at lower levels. See
U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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persons must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some
ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike. '" 180 Yet, one commentator has stated that
courts have developed doctrines and drawn lines that
distinguish between state- and federally sponsored alienage
discrimination, between deprivations of constitutional and
sub constitutional rights, between the rights afforded to
permanent resident aliens and those afforded to
undocumented or other nonresident aliens, between
economic and political forms of alienage discrimination, and
between discriminatory action taken by different branches
or agencies of the federal government. 181
The Refugee Act of 1980 recognized discriminatory practices in
the application of asylum policy, and attempted to resolve those
practices to create reasonable distinctions and to treat similarly
circumstanced asylum seekers alike. 182 While the Refugee Act of
1980 took a large step forward in formalizing asylum practices and
allowing a more equitable system of application, problems of
disparate treatment still remain. 183 This disparate treatment is
heightened by legislatively enacted per se asylum protection for
Cubans and Chinese nationals. 184
These legislatively created
preferences and rebuttable presumptions of persecution violate
notions of equal protection and undermine the purpose of the Refugee
Act of 1980; 185 further, they are a vestige of old policies, and
continue to perpetuate misconceptions about those who seek
protection at U.S. borders as well as those already in the United
States who are still perceived as different. 186

180. Kai Wu Chan v. Reno, 916 F. Supp. 1289, 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (quoting Francis v.
INS, 532 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir. 1976)).
181. BOSNIAK, supra note 17, at 49 (footnotes omitted).
182. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).
183. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 78, at 506.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 91-94.
185. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 78, at 506 (citing Kennedy, supra note 81, at 143).
186. In the context of race, for example, the impact of asylum protection that distinguishes
based on race, and preference for "sameness," reinforces "domestic subordination of
the same racial minority groups who are excluded. . . . Exclusion in immigration laws
must be viewed as an integral part of a larger mosaic of racial discrimination in
American society." Nessel, supra note 7, at 694 (citing KEVIN R. JOHNSON, OPENING
THE FLOODGATES: WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION
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For example, Chinese men and women are treated differently in
terms of the persecution they suffer as the result of losing a child.
The woman who carried the child, by virtue of being subject to the
procedure that ends a fetus's existence, is deemed worthy of asylum
without proving anything beyond the fact that she suffered an
unwanted abortion; 187 she must simply claim it was forced. 188 The
father of the child, on the other hand, must show that he was
persecuted for other activities. 189 It is not enough that a father
actively attempted to avoid the abortion by trying to hide his wife,
arguing with cadre officials, or otherwise trying to prevent the loss. 190
He must demonstrate he suffered a separate and distinct episode of
persecution aside from the abortion itself. 191 This disparity is highly
problematic because it does not recognize that the father has as much
a claim to the loss of his child as the mother. 192
The reality, however, is that this disparity reflects our own societal
judgments about the impact the loss of a fetus has on a father. Our
society views abortion as a woman's issue, particularly where
abortion is elective. 193 Although fathers have legal rights in adoption
decisions and those involving matters like frozen embryos, our
country has not extended that legal protection to putative fathers in
the context of abortion. 194 Fathers who experience the loss of a child

187.
188.
189.
190.

191.
192.

193.

194.

LAWS 153 (2007)). On some level, "[i]mmigration law allows the United States to do
at its borders what it cannot do within them." JOHNSON, supra, at 89.
See Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 02-4611, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS
28465, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov. 13,2006).
/d.; In re J-S-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 520, 520 (Att'y Gen. 2008).
See In re J-S-, 24 1. & N. Dec. at 520.
See, e.g., Bi Qi Liu v. Holder, 349 F. App'x 664, 665 (2d Cir. 2009); Cheng Lin v.
Holder, 314 F. App'x 371, 372 (2d Cir. 2009); Xiao Fei Dong v. Mukasey, 307 F.
App'x 547, 549 (2d Cir. 2009); Hao Zhu v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 316, 323 (7th Cir.
2006).
See, e.g., Bi Qi Liu, 394 F. App'x at 665; Cheng Lin, 314 F. App'x at 372; Xiao Fei
Dong, 307 F. App'x at 549; Hao Zhu, 465 F.3d at 323.
This argument does not try to ignore the obvious, that a woman has undergone an
invasive physical procedure where the man has not. But as noted, infra notes 208-09
and accompanying text, women who are required to submit to insertion of an
intrauterine device are not presumptively entitled to asylum and women who are
required to submit to frequent physical exams to check for pregnancy are not either.
Instead, a woman must be forcibly required to end a pregnancy for the presumption to
attach.
See Catherine T. Coyle, Men and Abortion: A Review of Empirical Reports
Concerning the Impact of Abortion on Men, 3 INTERNET J. MENTAL HEALTH (2007),
http://www.ispub.comlostia/index.php?xm1FilePath=journals/ijrnh/vo13 n21
abortion.xml.
See id.
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via miscarriage do not fare much better, even though research
suggests they evidence a higher degree of difficulty coping than
women. 195 Recent research indicates that men suffer from the same
postabortion psychological issues that women do. 196 Men report
feeling depression, anxiety, helplessness, and guilt. 197 This not only
impacts the couple but has implications for the parents' relationship
with their extended family as well. 198
Currently, a woman in the United States may have an abortion, and
the father has no legal rights to prevent it. 199 If a woman miscarries,
then often a father's feelings are not the paramount concern. While it
is true that a woman carrying a child may bond with it faster, the
reality is that for a man who wants a child, the loss is just as palpable,
particularly where the loss was not only involuntary but forced. 200
Assigning these roles to Chinese fathers does them a disservice
because this country does not engage in or allow forced abortion, and
so there is no social construct to address it. It does more than simply
impose a value judgment on the role of the father in Chinese society:
it fails to recognize the oppressive atmosphere and official capacity in
which forced abortions are carried out.
Chinese men have been cast as opportunists, taking advantage of
the option to travel to the United States and leave their families

195. See id.; Marya Burgess, How Miscarriage Can Hit Very Hard, BBC NEWS (June 19,
2006), http://news.bbc.co.ukl2lhi/5082442.stm (noting that the impact on men goes
unrecognized and that men are stuck between a rock and hard place, socially not
permitted to be too emotional or too stoic). Men's grief can also take a different form,
with a man trying to problem-solve, take action, gather facts, or simply avoid the grief
by working. After a Miscarriage: Surviving Emotionally, AM. PREGNANCY ASS'N,
http://www .americanpregnancy .org/pregnancyloss/mcsurvivingemotionally.html (last
updated Oct. 2008) [hereinafter After a Miscarriage].
196. Coyle, supra note 193.

197. Id.
198. Francine De Montigny et aI., A Baby Has Died: The Impact of Perinatal Loss on
Family Social Networks, 28 1. OBSTETRIC GYNECOLOGIC & NEONATAL NURSING 151,
152-53 (1999) (reporting that family members' quality and quantity of ties with their
network were profoundly affected by prenatal loss and many suffered the permanent
loss of relationships with friends, colleagues, or extended family members).
199. See Planned Parenthood of Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-69 (1976) (holding that
the state is not required to notify or obtain permission from a woman's husband when
she seeks an abortion).
200. See After a Miscarriage, supra note 195 (explaining that "[a] woman can begin
bonding [with a baby] from the moment she has a positive pregnancy test"); Coyle,
supra note 193 (describing the feelings of "worthlessness," "voicelessness," and
"emasculation" a man experiences after learning that his girlfriend had an abortion
without informing him).
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behind. 201 This, again, fails to recognize a reality of immigration that
has been present for decades. Our current legislative policy toward
China's CPC fails to take into account a cultural norm that,
historically, men immigrate first and then their families follow. 202
In her concurrence in In Re C- Y-Z, 203 Board Member Rosenberg
noted the following:
The fact that respondent preceded his family is no different
from the cultural practice followed by hundreds of
thousands of immigrants and refugees who fled anti-Semitic
pogroms in czarist Russia, famine in Ireland, [or] fascism in
Germany. . .. The men come first; the husband and father
forges the way for the wife and children, who follow when
he has established a place to live and a means to support
them. In an ideal world, perhaps she who has suffered the
more egregious physical persecution should be the first to
leave the zone of danger and be afforded refuge. In any
event, the applicant's conformity with historical and cultural
norms in preceding his wife and family certainly has no
bearing either on the merits of his asylum claim or on the
exercise of discretion. 204
Rosenberg hit upon an important consideration in deciding what
type of asylum claims are entitled to per se relief. More than one
Chinese father has been vilified in a court opinion for leaving his
wife and children behind to come to the United States. 205 Oddly, the
201.

Patricia Wen, Law Offers Chinese a Path to US Policy Giving Asylum to Those
Facing Coerced Birth Control Benefits Mostly Men, Bas. GLOBE, Aug. 18, 2002, at

Bl ("Of the 10,000 Chinese people who have obtained political asylum based on
China's one-child policy, federal statistics show, three out of four are men.").
202. ld. (noting that most men who are granted asylum petition to have the rest of their
family join them). Even our immigration statutes contemplate derivative status and
family members arriving at different times depending upon the circumstances. See,
e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 207.7 (2010). In fact, immediate relatives of United States citizens
brought in through family immigration laws account for more than 40% of the annual
flow of legal immigrants to this country. RANDALL MONGER, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, U.S. LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENTS: 2009
3 tb1.2 (2010), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/
Iprjr_2009.pd£ Twenty-eight percent of legal immigrants to the United States are
spouses brought by a legal resident and 8.7% are children brought by a parent who is
a legal immigrant. ld.
203. 211. & N. Dec. 915,927 (B.I.A. 1997) (concurring opinion).
204. ld.
205. See, e.g., Yin Fang Lin v. Holder, No. 09-2398-ag, 2010 WL 3733910, at "'I (2d Cir.
Sept. 27,2010).
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wife will likely not be subject to further persecution when he is gone
because she is not likely to get pregnant in his absence. 206 Because
the bar is now set even higher, the applicants must deviate from what
may be deemed culturally appropriate by sending mothers ahead. 207
This makes little sense because the per se presumption of
persecution for women, who are forcibly aborted, contemplates more
than a physical invasion of a woman's person. Generally, an
abortion, if performed correctly, does not impede a woman from
becoming pregnant again. The real loss, and the loss that the
protective statute inherently recognizes, is the loss of that child. 208
Chinese women are not entitled to per se asylum from temporary
sterilization, such as forced insertion of an intrauterine device, even
though this too is an invasive procedure; nor are they entitled to per
se asylum when they are subject to monthly exams to check for
illegal pregnancy. 209
If the child is desired by both parents, then the harm extends to
both parents regardless of the legal status of their relationship. Yet, a
father is precluded from relying on the loss of his unborn child to
support an asylum claim while a mother's sole basis for receiving a
rebuttable presumption of asylum is the loss of the same child. 210
While the mother may suffer physically as well, the emotional and
psychological harm extends to both parents. However, this harm is
not recognized by current legislation or policies. 211
This juxtaposition of parental protection is at odds with the
Refugee Act of 1980 because the Act recognized the fundamental
nature of the right to procreate. 212 The right to procreate must be
shared by both parents, and should be reflected in protection
extended to those who suffer persecution based on their desire to
206. Rabkin, supra note 129, at 970-71 (discussing how couples who have "unapproved
children" often face high fines, forced abortions, and sterilization).
207. See In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 927.
208. See 8 U.S.C. § I 101 (a)(42) (2006) (stating that "a person who has been forced to abort
a pregnancy . . . shall be deemed to have been persecuted on account of political
opinion").
209. See id. (omitting a presumption of persecution for temporary sterilization or routine
exams to check for illegal pregnancy).
210. See id.
211. See, e.g., id.
212. Pub. L. No. 96-212,94 Stat. 102. Even the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides that men and women have the right to marry and to found a family.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 21, art. 16(1). It goes on to
recognize that the "family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is
entitled to protection by society and the State." Id. art. 16(3).
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procreate. Thus, this failure to extend protection to similarly situated
individuals runs afoul of our notions of eaual protection 213 as well as
the intent of the Refugee Act itself. 2 I
It also carries with it
stereotypes U.S. culture has adopted and does not consider whether
fathers are treated similarly in China. 215
If we are to recognize that a single event can satisfy the definition
of refugee for the purposes of asylum, then we should not lay
judgment on the length of time it takes an applicant to arrive in the
United States or how a family unit decides who should come first.
Even in the case of a boyfriend or former spouse, the loss of his
unborn child should be the triggering event, not the procedure
performed. If Congress feels that such an application is untenable,
then the requirements imposed upon Chinese men whose unborn
children have been forcibly aborted should also be imposed upon the
women who carried those unborn children. 216 This would impose the
same requirement, "other resistance," on both classes of claimants
and establish equitable treatment for the same harm. 217
The treatment of Cuban and Haitian nationals offers another view
of the problem with extending preferential legislative protection to
one group of potential asylees without taking a sufficiently broad
view of the implications. It also illuminates why, at a minimum, such
legislation should be revisited with regularity instead of simply
adapted to shifting politics on an ad hoc basis.
While there may have been a justification for treating the first
waves of Cuban immigrants differently because of the sudden shift in
government, modem waves of Cuban and Haitian refugees are more
alike than different: they typically seek to escape poverty as well as
government oppression. The difference in their treatment is based on

213. See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
216. Theoretically, this is not a one-time harm. See In re C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915,
915-16 (B.I.A. 1997). If a couple continues to become pregnant in violation of
coercive population control, a woman may be subject to forced abortion, and both
may face the loss of yet another unborn child. See id. While the woman may
disproportionately bear the physical and psychological burden, it should not diminish
the harm suffered by the man simply because he cannot become pregnant. See id. at
920-23,926--27 (concurring opinion). This is particularly true in this context, where
the question is not who suffered the physical act, but who has suffered persecution at
the hands of a government or other group. See id. at 926--27.
217.
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-2008 § 601(a)(l), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-689 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101 (a)(42)).
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historic conceptions and value judgments placed on those entering
that have not withstood the test oftime. 218
The first wave of Cubans were white, middle-aged, and welleducated. 219 They were the product of a society that was pre-Castro
and anti-Castro. 220 They fled Communist tyranny in family units. 221
The second wave, who arrived from 1965 to 1970, were still mostly
white and educated, working class, and came in family units. 222 It
was this group of immigrants that Congress sought to protect,
because they were "like us" and deemed capable of assimilation. 223
Again, we judged them by their sameness and enacted legislation to
protect them. When the next waves of Cuban nationals arrived, they
became less like us, and the public was less interested in
accommodating them. 224
In 1980, the Marielitos, who were the last big wave of refugees
from Cuba, were blue collar, less educated, and younger. 225 Many
did not come with families. 226 Many spoke only Spanish; half were
black. 227 Many expressed economic reasons for seeking refuge in the
United States rather than expressing a basis recognized by the
Refugee Act of 1980.228 These people, in many instances, were also
the first generation to have grown up under Fidel Castro. 229 They had
not experienced anything other than communism, and fled, not to
escape political persecution, but to try their luck in America or to
escape food scarcity in Cuba. 230 These circumstances are not
markedly different from illegal immigrants fleeing to the United
States to avoid similar hardships in many countries around the world,
including Haiti. 231 In spite of this shift, Congress did nothing to
adjust the requirements for Cuban refugees. 232 Even in the face of
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

229.
230.
231.
232.

See infra notes 219-23.
HINo, supra note 79, at 257.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Mirando por los Dios, supra note 74, at 910-11.
See id. at 914; HINo, supra note 79, at 256.
HINo, supra note 79, at 257.
Id.
Id.
See Mirando por los Dios, supra note 74, at 912-13. In fact, many Marielitos initially
explained their departure as a result of food scarcity or desire to earn more money in
United States. See id.; Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 78, at 507.
See Arteaga, supra note 10, at 513 n.37.
Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 78, at 507.
Arteaga, supra note 10, at 545.
PORTES & BACH, supra note 74, at 85; Mirando por los Dios, supra note 74, at 907.
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comparison with Haitian refugees who were seeking to escape
political turmoil surrounding the Duvaliers' ruthless reign,233 the
legislative protections stood. The scale has remained tipped so far in
favor of Cubans it makes Congress look ridiculous.
When Clinton entered into an accord with Cuba to reduce the flow
of Cuban asylum seekers, both countries agreed to the wet foot, dry
foot policy. 234 Regrettably, this policy created a whole new class of
presumptively protected Cubans-those that made it to shore-which
has created its own problems.235 Now, in addition to treating Cubans
differently than other asylum seekers, there is even a distinction
between Cubans who plant one foot on United States soil and those
who are interdicted just off shore, regardless of whether either person
has a valid underlying claim for asylum. 236
The purposeful protections enumerated in the Cuban Adjustment
Act have outlived their usefulness and do not reflect the realities of
today.237 Neither the nature of those who seek protection upon arrival
on our shores, nor the competing interests of other similarly situated
asylum seekers permit the continued reliance on this legislative
protection. 238 The problem is that there is no practical mechanism
other than repeal of the Cuban Adjustment Act, which would literally
take an act of Congress, to properly address this problem. 239 Rather
than take an opportunity to adjust the status of all Cuban refugees, the

233.

234.
235.
236.

237.
238.
239.

See Times Topics: Francois Duvalier, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.coml
top/reference/timestopics/peopleldlfrancois_ duvalier/index.html (last visited May 16,
2011). Francois Duvalier was "President for Life" in Haiti from 1957 until he died in
1971. Id. His son, Jean-Claude Duvalier, ruled the country until 1986 when he was
overthrown. Id. Both regimes were marked by corruption, brutality, and significant
human rights abuses. See Larry Rohter, Mission to Haiti: The Thugs-Loose
Cannons; Violence by Paramilitary Groups in Haiti Raises Pressure on u.s. to
Disarm Them, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1994, at 1, available at www.nytimes.coml
1994/1 DID 1Iworldlmission-haiti-thugs-Ioose-cannons-violence-paramilitary-groupshaiti-raises.html?fta=y (noting that the United States was doing little to control the
plain clothes paramilitary called attaches who kill at will).
Mirando par los Ojos, supra note 74, at 907.
Id.
Id. Even worse, instead of creating an understandable immigration policy that
addresses the needs of asylum seekers traveling here by sea, Congress and the
Executive have created a game of "immigration roulette." Those seeking asylum by
traveling to our shores, particularly Cubans, have a huge incentive in the form of
parole status when they arrive. Id. However, the reality is that many lose their lives
seeking the promise of easy entry once they stand ashore. See generally Nessel, supra
note 7.
See Mirando par los Ojos, supra note 74, at 911-14.
Id. at 912-15.
Id. at 917.
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only shift in policy U.S. government has undertaken has resulted in
yet another preferential subset of Cuban refugees. 240
Instead of maintaining these problematic legislatively created
presumptions for discrete groups at the expense of a broader class of
potential refugees, a full application of the Refugee Act of 1980
would be more practical. Legislative enhancements could still be
used to support the Refugee Act, but every asylum applicant would
have to satisfy the burden of demonstrating he or she is a refugee
without the benefit of a rebuttable presumption of persecution. For
example, those who suffer persecution as a result of a coercive
population control may be deemed, via legislation or regulation, to
have been persecuted on account of political opinion, but those
designations should stop short of creating presumptive classes of
refugees. Such an action could help other groups of potential asylees
as well, including victims of domestic violence. In such a situation,
an applicant for asylum would still have to demonstrate persecution,
which lies at the heart of every asylum claim. 241 In the case of
Chinese nationals, it would mean that both men and women would
have to prove something beyond a forced abortion, such as actual
resistance, but the policy would create a more equitable treatment of
these claims. 242
In the same way, the Cuban Adjustment Act could be repealed and
Cuban "dry foot" refugees would be in no worse a position than their
"wet foot" counterparts or other similarly situated asylum seekers. 243
With fewer Cubans being granted automatic parole status, perhaps
more equitable treatment of Haitian asylum claims could be achieved,
even in conjunction with current interdiction policies. 244
V. CONCLUSION
While no system will be perfect, and our country's current system
is far from perfect, we must continue to move forward in removing

240.
241.
242.
243.

See id. at 915.
See id. at 919.
See supra notes 208-11 and 217 and accompanying text.
This may be a good time to revisit our position on Cuba given the current economic
reforms Cuba plans to implement. See Marc Lacey, Cuba Resets the Revolution, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, at WK.l, available at http://www.nytimes.coml2010/09119/
weekinreview/19Iacey.html. Cuba recently announced that it is implementing broadbased economic changes including cutting 10% of the government work force and
permitting much more extensive privatization. Id.
244. The wisdom of our current interdiction policies, and their future, is beyond the scope
of this article.
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vestiges of discriminatory asylum preferences that originated in the
1951 Refugee Convention and remain today. The application of
nondiscriminatory asylum policies is an aspiration that is worth
pursuing, and the removal of legislative preferences is the next step in
that process.

